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Abstract
According to Cantor, a set is a collection into a whole of defined and
separate (we shall say distinct) objects. So, a natural question is “How
to treat as ‘sets’ collections of indistinguishable objects?”. This is the
aim of quasi-set theory, and this problem was posed as the first of
present day mathematics, in the list resulting from the Congress on
the Hilbert Problems in 1974. Despite this pure mathematical moti-
vation, quasi-sets have also a strong commitment to the way quantum
physics copes with elementary particles. In this paper, we discuss the
axiomatics of quasi-set theory and sketch some of its applications in
physics. We also show that quasi-set theory allows us a better and
deeper understanding of the role of the concept of equality in mathe-
matics.
1 Introduction
It is well known that quantum theories treat elementary particles as enti-
ties which may be absolutely indistinguishable, having all their properties in
common. Physicists say that they are ‘identical’, while philosophers prefer
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to call them indistinguishable, since the standard philosophical jargon re-
gards identical things to be the very same thing. Standard set theories like
Zermelo-Fraenkel are so that the elements of a set (so as the sets themselves)
obey a well defined theory of identity, according to which, roughly speaking,
two objects a and b are always either equal or distinct; furthermore, if they
are equal, then they are the very same object. If they are distinct, there
exists at least one set to which one of them belongs while the another one
does not (in extensional contexts, we may say that there exists at least one
property which distinguishes them, a result which is usually termed Leibniz
Law). In particular, the elements of a set can always be considered as indi-
viduals of a sort, being capable (at least ideally) of being counted, ordered
or named.
In this sense, standard set theories cannot deal with “genuine” collections
of indistinguishable objects. Sets are, according to the well known “defini-
tion” given by Cantor, “collections of definite and separate objects of our
intuition or of our thought” (see [2], p. 85). The axioms of the standard
set theories preserve this intuitive idea. The usual way mathematicians may
consider indistinguishable things vary. The most common devices are either
the consideration of permutational symmetries or group invariance [26]. The
general idea of these approaches can be summed up by the technique pre-
sented by H. Weyl [27]; in short our starting point is a set of, say, n elements
endowed with an equivalence relation R. The equivalence classes C1, . . . , Ck
were taken to play the role of collections of indistinguishable objects. But
this device makes sense only if we hide the very nature of the original set as
a collection of distinguishable objects, as given by the axioms of set theory.
So, this device cannot be considered to be a right answer to the problem of
finding axioms (in the sense of ‘set’ theories) to deal with collections of indis-
tinguishable objects. Similar restrictions can be made to the other techniques
usually considered by mathematicians (see, for example, [21]).
But why this kind of problem should be important? Let us recall that
this is the first problem in the list proposed during the Congress on the
Hilbert Problems, organized by the American Mathematical Society in 1974
(see [1] p. 36). The motivation for stating this problem is of course quan-
tum physics, which deals (whithin the scope of classical set theories!) with
indistinguishable objects; as put by Yuri Manin, when presenting the just
mentioned problem,
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We should consider possibilities of developing a totally new lan-
guage to speak about infinity (...) I would like to point out that
(...) [the usual language of set theory] is (...) an extrapolation
of common-place physics, where we can distinguish things, count
them, put them in some order, etc. New quantum physics has
shown us models of entities with quite different behaviour. Even
‘sets’ of photons in a looking-glass box, or of electrons in a nickel
piece are much less cantorian than the ‘set’ of grains of sand.
In general, a highly probabilistic ‘physical infinity’ looks consid-
erably more complicated and interesting than a plain infinity of
‘things’ (...) The twentieth century return to Middle Age scholas-
tics taught us a lot about formalisms. Probably it is time to look
outside again. Meaning is what really matters.
Of course that the problem is not only to find a way of expressing indistin-
guishability. Physicists do this by a trick of considering that only symmetric
and antisymmetric vectors on an appropriate Hilbert space have counterpart
in reality, but the interesting foundational problem is to consider indistin-
guishability right at the start , as something which is very peculiar of the
objects being supposed, as in the case of quantum objects [20]. In this sense,
we should not consider the objects first as individuals, as when we take them
as elements of a set, and then to find a way of imagining them as indistin-
guishable entities. Indistinguishability should be a primitive concept; things
should be postulated to be so that they could be indistinguishable without
turnig to be identical. But, how to build a theory in which identity has no
meaning (at least within some scope) but indistinguishability is meaningful if
classical logic and set theories are strongly commited with Leibniz Law? This
is what we present in this paper, which should be regarded as a continuation
of a serie of works on the foundations of quasi set theory and its possible
consequences in mathematics, physics, and, consequently, philosophy.
One natural question that could be raised by the reader is: why should
we use quasi-set theory in physics? According to any textbook about statis-
tical mechanics, we know that Maxwell-Boltzmann (MB) statistics gives us
the most probable distribution of N distinguishable objects into, say, boxes
with a specified number of objects in each box. We show, e.g., that the hy-
pothesis concerning distinguishable objects is unnecessary. Usually, classical
and quantum distribution functions are mathematically derived in a na¨ıve
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fashion; but in our case an axiomatic framework is necessary if we want to
show that individuality is not a necessary assumption in classical statistical
mechanics. In a very interesting paper N. Huggett [10] demonstrates that
the occurence of Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics in classical mechanics does
not allow us to decide the metaphysical issue of molecules in a gas. In this
paper we show that Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics is not committed to a
metaphysical hypothesis concerning individuals.
2 Quasi-sets
In trying to build a theory of collections of indistinguishable objects in
the sense mentioned in the previous section, we strongly consider the mo-
tivation provided by quantum physics, with particular emphasis to Erwin
Schro¨dinger’s idea that the concept of identity does not make sense for ele-
mentary particles [23, 24]. In brief, this suggests that if x and y denote, say,
electrons, it is simply meaningless to say that x is identical (or different) from
y. The lack of meaning of such a way of speaking goes in the same direc-
tion than that one posed by W. Heinsenberg when he explains why from the
point of view of modern physics the problem posed by the ancient atomists
of looking for the ultimate parts of matter has no meaning. As he said ([9],
p. 82),
We ask, ‘What does the proton consist of?’ ‘Is the light-quantum
simple, or is it composite?’ But these questions are wrongly put,
since the words divide or consist of have largely lost their mean-
ing. It would thus be our task to adapt our language and thought,
and hence also our scientific philosophy, to this new situation en-
gendered by the experiments.
Quasi-set theory was developed with the aim of providing axioms for
dealing with collections of indistinguishable objects. In a certain sense, it
provides an answer to the ‘Manin Problem’ mentioned above.
Quasi-set theory Q is based on ZFU -like axioms (Zermelo-Fraenkel with
Urelemente), but allows the existence of two sorts of atoms, termed respec-
tively m-atoms and M-atoms. Two primitive unary predicates help in ex-
pressing that: m(x) says that x is an m-atom and M(x) says that x is an
M-atom, where x is an individual variable. The language still encompasses
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the binary primitive predicates ≡ (indistinguishability) and ∈ (membership),
one unary functional symbol qc (quasi-cardinal) and a unary predicate letter
Z (where Z(x) says that x is a set ; these quasi-sets will correspond precisely
to the sets of ZFU ). The basic idea is that the M-atoms have the proper-
ties of standard Urelemente of ZFU , while the m-atoms may be thought of
as representing elementary particles of quantum physics. Following Erwin
Schrdinger, to this last kind of entities, the concept of identity cannot be
applied ([23], pp. 17-8).1 In quasi set theory, this restriction is achieved by
a restriction on the concept of formula: expressions like x = y are not well
formed if x and y denote m-atoms, despite the expression x ≡ y, which is
read ‘x is indistinguishable from y’ makes sense for all the objects of the
domain. The equality symbol is not primitive in our theory, but a concept
of extensional identity is defined (see below) so that it has all the properties
of standard identity of ZFU. Then, the axiomatics permits us to distinguish
between the concepts of (extensional) identity (being the very same object)
and indistinguishability (agreement with respect to all the attributes), which
cannot be done in classical logic and set theory.2
A quasi-set (qset for short) x is defined as something which is not a
Urelemente. A qset x may have a cardinal (termed its quasi cardinal , and
denoted by qc(x)) but, in general, it has not an ordinal, since there are quasi
sets which cannot be ordered (since their elements are indistinguishable m-
atoms, expressed by the relation ≡). The concept of quasi cardinal is taken
as primitive, since it cannot be defined by usual means. This fits the idea
that quantum particles cannot be ordered or counted, but only aggregated
in certain amounts. Notwithstanding, due to the concept of quasi cardinal,
there is a sense (as in ortodox quantum physics) in saying that there may
exist a certain quantity of m-atoms obeying certain conditions, despite they
cannot be named or labeled.
The primitive relation of indistinguishability (≡) is postulated to be re-
flexive, symmetric and transitive, but in order to differenciate it from identity
as ascribed by the traditional (first-order) theory of identity, the substitu-
tivity axiom does not hold. Even so, it should be interesting that such a
1When we talk on ‘the traditional concept of identity’ we mean the theory of identity
as presented in standard mathematics, either in first order theories or in higher order ones
(and set theory).
2In standard mathematics, two entities x and y which have the same properties are the
very same entity; this is Leibniz’s Law, as already remarked.
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relation, which holds in the whole domain, turns to be the standard identity
(here represented by the extensional identity defined below) when the objects
under consideration are not m-atoms. Then a concept of extensional identity
fits the idea of classical identity. The first definitions and axioms are the
following:
Definition 1
1. Q(x) := ¬(m(x)∨M(x)). We read Q(x) as “x is a quasi-set” or “x is
a qset”.
2. P (x) := Q(x) ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x⇒ m(y)) ∧ ∀y∀z(y ∈ x ∧ z ∈ x⇒ y ≡ z). In
this case we say that x is a pure qset.
3. D(x) := M(x) ∨ Z(x). These are the ‘(classical) things’, to use Zer-
melo’s original terminology. We read D(x) as “x is a Dinge/”.
4. E(x) := Q(x) ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x⇒ Q(y)).
5. x =E y := (Q(x)∧Q(y)∧∀z(z ∈ x⇔ z ∈ y))∨(M(x)∧M(y)∧∀Qz(x ∈
z ⇔ y ∈ z)). In this case we say that x and y are extensionaly identical.
The symbol “=E” is called extensional identity.
6. x ⊆ y := ∀z(z ∈ x⇒ z ∈ y).
The first axioms of Q are:
(Q1) ∀x(x ≡ x)
(Q2) ∀x∀y(x ≡ y ⇒ y ≡ x)
(Q3) ∀x∀y∀z(x ≡ y ∧ y ≡ z ⇒ x ≡ z)
(Q4) ∀x∀y(x =E y ⇒ (A(x, x)⇒ A(x, y))), with the usual syntactic restric-
tions.
Theorem 1 Whether Q(x) or M(x), then x =E x.
Proof: If Q(x), since ∀z(z ∈ x ⇔ z ∈ x), then x =E x by the definition of
extensional identity. If M(x), then since x ≡ x by Q1, it follows that
x =E x. ✷
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Corolary 1 The relation of extensional equality has all the properties of
classical equality.
Proof: Straightforward, if we take into account the above theorem and Q4.
✷
(Q5) Nothing is at the same time an m-atom and an M-atom:
∀x(¬(m(x) ∧M(x)))
Theorem 2 Wheter Q(x) or M(x), then ¬m(x).
Proof: If Q(x), then ¬m(x) by the definition of qset. If M(x), then ¬m(x)
by Q5. ✷
(Q6) The atoms are empty:
∀x∀y(x ∈ y ⇒ Q(y))
(Q7) Every set is a qset:
∀x(Z(x)⇒ Q(x))
(Q8) Qsets whose elements are ‘classical things’ are sets and conversely:
∀Qx(∀y(y ∈ x⇒ D(y))⇔ Z(x))
What is the meaning of Q8? Our intention is to characterize the sets in Q
so that they can be identifyed with the sets of ZFU . This is supposed to be
achieved if they were taken to be those qsets whose transitive closure (this
concept can be defined in the usual sense) does not contain m-atoms. The
‘⇒-part’ of Q8 gives half of the answer: if all the elements of x are Dinge
(either sets of M-atoms), then x is a set. Concerning the converse, it is not
enough to postulate that no element of a set is an m-atom, since it may be
that the elements of its elements have m-atoms as elements and so on. The
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problem can be satisfactorily solved if we have Z(x) ⇒ ∀y(y ∈ x ⇒ D(y)),
which is precisely the ‘⇐-part’ of Q8.
(Q9)
∀x(m(x) ∧ x ≡ y ⇒ m(y)) ∧ ∀x∀y(x =E y ∧M(x)⇒M(y))
∧∀x∀y(x =E y ∧ Z(x)⇒ Z(y))
(Q10) The empty qset: there exists a qset denoted by ‘∅’, which does not
have elements:
∃Qx∀y(¬(y ∈ x))
Theorem 3 The empty qset is a set.
Proof: Take x =E ∅. Since y ∈ x is false by Q10, then the antecedent of
∀y(y ∈ x⇒ D(x)) is true, hence Z(x) by Q8. ✷
(Q11) Indistinguishable Dinge are extensionally identicals:
∀Dx∀Dy(x ≡ y ⇒ x =E y)
(Q12) This is the qset-theoretical version of the weak-pair axiom. For all
x and y, there exists a qset whose elements are the indistinguishable from
either x or y:
∀x∀y∃Qz∀t(t ∈ z ⇔ t ≡ x ∨ t ≡ y)
We denote this qset by [x, y] and {x, y} when x and y are Dinge, as usual.
As we will see below after giving the idea of the quantity of elements of a
qset (by means of the primitive concept of quasi-cardinal), the quasi-cardinal
of [x] may be different from 1, where [x] := [x, x].
(Q13) The Separation Schema: by considering the usual syntactical restric-
tions on the formula A(t), the following is an axiom:
∀Qx∃Qy∀t(t ∈ y ⇔ t ∈ x ∧A(t))
This qset is written [t ∈ x : A(t)] (we may use { and } when such a qset
is a set).
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(Q14) Union
∀Qx(E(x)⇒ ∃Qy(∀z(z ∈ y)⇔ ∃t(z ∈ t ∧ t ∈ x)))
This qset is denoted by
⋃
t∈x t (we also use x ∪ y as usual).
(Q15) Power-qset
∀Qx∃Qy∀t(t ∈ y ⇔ t ⊆ x)
According to the standard notation, we write P(x) for this qset.
Definition 2
1. 〈x, y〉 := [[x], [x, y]]
2. x× y := [〈z, u〉 ∈ PP(x ∪ y) : z ∈ x ∧ u ∈ y]
3. The concepts of intersection and difference of qsets are defined in the
usual way so that t ∈ x∩y iff t ∈ x∧t ∈ y and t ∈ x−y iff t ∈ x∧t /∈ y.
This last concept will be mentioned again later. It is worth to note that
the symbol ‘/∈’ has its usual meaning as in set theory.
We remark that 〈x, y〉 is a kind of ‘generalized ordered pair’, since the
first element is the qset of all indistinguishable from x, while the second is
the qset of all indistinguishable from y. We call it the ‘weak pair’. The
collection [x] is termed a ‘weak singleton’ of x.
(Q16) Infinity:
∃Qx(∅ ∈ x ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x ∧Q(y)⇒ y ∪ [y] ∈ x))
.
(Q17) Regularity: (Qsets are well-founded):
∀Qx(E(x) ∧ x 6=E ∅ ⇒ ∃Qy(y ∈ x ∧ y ∩ x =E ∅))
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2.1 Relations
Definition 3 A qset w is a relation if it satisfies the following predicate R:
R(w) := Q(w) ∧ ∀z(z ∈ w ⇒ ∃u∃v(u ∈ x ∧ v ∈ y ∧ z =E 〈u, v〉))
Theorem 4 No partial, total or strict order relation can be defined on a
pure qset whose elements are indistinguishable from one another.
Proof: (Sketch) Partial and total orders require antisymmetry, and this
property cannot be stated without identity. Asymmetry also cannot
be supposed, for, if x ≡ y, then for every R such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ R, and
there it follows that 〈x, y〉 =E [[x]] =E 〈y, x〉 ∈ R; so, xRy entails yRx.
✷
Theorem 5 For every formula A of ZFU let Aq be its translation to the
language of Q, then ⊢ZFU A iff ⊢Q A
q.
Proof: The theory Q encompasses a ‘classical’ counterpart which can be
defined as follows: let A be a formula of the language of ZFU (which
we may admit has an unary predicate S which stands for ‘sets’. Then,
call Aq its translation to Q, defined as follows, where S(x) means that
x is a set (in ZFU):
1. If A is S(x), then Aq is Z(x)
2. If A is x = y, then Aq is ((M(x)∧M(y))∨(Z(y)∧Z(y))∧x =E y)
3. If A is x ∈ y, then Aq is ((M(x) ∨ Z(x)) ∧ Z(y)) ∧ x ∈ y
4. If A is ¬B, then Aq is ¬Bq
5. If A is B ∨ C, then Aq is Bq ∨ Cq
6. If A is ∀xB, then Aq is ∀x(M(x) ∨ Z(x)⇒ B)
Then it is easy to see that the translations of the axioms of ZFU are
theorems of Q. So, if Q is consistent, so is ZFU (see [3]). ✷
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The result above shows that there is a copy of ZFU in Q. In this ‘copy’,
we may define the following concepts: Cd(x) for ‘x is a cardinal’; card(x)
denotes ‘the cardinal of x, and Fin(x) says that ‘x is a finite quasi-set’ (that
is, qc(x) is a natural number).
By considering these concepts, we may present the axioms for quasi-
cardinals:
(Q18) Every object which is not a qset (that is, every Urelement) has quasi-
cardinal zero:
∀x(¬Q(x)⇒ qc(x) =E 0)
(Q19) The quasi-cardinal of a qset is a cardinal (defined in the ‘classical
part’ of the theory and coincides with the cardinal itself when this qset is a
set:
∀Qx∃!y(Cd(y) ∧ y =E qc(x) ∧ (Z(x)⇒ y =E card(x)))
(Q20) Every non-empty qset has a non null quasi-cardinal:
∀Qx(x 6=E ∅ ⇒ qc(x) 6=E 0)
(Q21) ∀Qx(qc(x) =E α⇒ ∀β(β ≤E α⇒ ∃Qy(y ⊆ x ∧ qc(y) =E β))
(Q22) ∀Qx∀Qy∀t(y ⊆ x→ qc(y) ≤E qc(x))
(Q23) ∀Qx∀Qy(Fin(x) ∧ x ⊂ y ⇒ qc(x) < qc(y))
(Q24) ∀Qx∀Qy(∀w(w /∈ x ∨ w /∈ y)⇒ qc(x ∪ y) =E qc(x) + qc(y))
In the next axiom, 2qc(x) denotes (intuitively) the quantity of subquasi-
sets of x. Then,
(Q25) ∀Qx(qc(P(x)) =E 2
qc(x))
Axiom Q25 raises an interesting discussion we mention below. But first
we need the concept of quasi-function.
2.2 Quasi-functions
Standard functions could not distinguish between arguments and values. So,
we pose:
11
Definition 4 If x and y are qsets and R is the predicate for ‘relation’ defined
above, we say that f is a quasi-function (qfunction) if it satisfies the following
predicate:
QF (f) := R(f) ∧ ∀u(u ∈ x⇒ ∃v(v ∈ y ∧ 〈u, v〉 ∈ f))∧
∀u∀u′∀v∀v′(〈u, v〉 ∈ f ∧ 〈u′, v′〉 ∈ f ∧ u ≡ u′ ⇒ v ≡ v′)
f is a q-injection if f is a q-function from x to y and satisfies the additional
condition:
∀u∀u′∀v∀v′(〈u, v〉 ∈ f ∧ 〈u′, v′〉 ∈ f ∧ v ≡ v′ ⇒ u ≡ u′)∧ qc(Dom(f)) ≤E
qc(Rang(f))
f is a q-surjection if it is a function from x to y such that
∀v(v ∈ y ⇒ ∃u(u ∈ x ∧ 〈u, v〉 ∈ f)) ∧ qc(Dem(f)) ≥E qc(Rang(f)).
A function f which is both a q-injection and a q-surjection is said to be a
q-bijection.
In this case, qc(Dom(f)) =E qc(Rang(f)).
2.3 How many subquasi-sets?
Now we can turn to the discussion involving the axiom Q25. Since the
concept of identity has no meaning for m-atoms, how can we ensure that
a qset x such that qc(x) =E α has precisely 2
α subqsets? In standard set
theories (so as in the ‘classical part’ of Q, that is, in considering those qsets
which fit the sets of ZFU ), as it is well known, if card(x) denotes the cardinal
of x, then by the definition of exponentiation of cardinals, 2card(x) is defined
to be the cardinal of the set x2, which is the set of all functions from x to
the Boolean algebra 2 = {0, 1} (see [4]). In Q this definition doesn’t work.
Let us explain why.
Suppose that α is the quasi-cardinal of x, which is a cardinal, by the
axiom Q19. This axiom says that every qset has a unique quasi-cardinal
which is a cardinal (defined in the ‘classical part’ of the theory), and if the
qset is in particular a set (inQ), then this quasi-cardinal is its cardinal stricto
sensu. So, every quasi-cardinal is a cardinal and the above expression ‘there
is a unique’ makes sense. Furthermore, from the fact that ∅ is a set, it follows
that its quasi-cardinal is 0. Then we may write
2qc(x) := qc(α2) (1)
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and then, since α is a cardinal and both α and 2 are Q-sets , we have
2qc(x) := card(α2) (2)
So, we may take the cardinal of the qset α2 in its usual sense to mean
2qc(x). Then, (2) gives meaning to the axiom Q25, since it explains what
does 2qc(x) mean: it is the cardinal of the set of all the applications from α
(the quasi-cardinal of x) in 2. By considering this, the axiom may be written
as follows, where x is a qset and α is its quasi-cardinal:
Axiom Q25 (Alternative Form)
∀Qx(qc(P(x))) =E card(
α2).
We remark that the second member of the equality has a precise meaning
in Q , since both α and 2 act as in classical set theories, as remarked above.
This characterization allows us to avoid another problem, which could be
thought to be derived in the quasi-set theory. To explain it, we recall that
in standard set theories we can prove that P(x) is equinumerous with x2 by
defining a one-one function f : P(x) →x 2 as follows: for every y ⊆ x, let
f(y) be the characteristic function of y, namely, the function χy : x → 2
defined by
χy(t) :=
{
1 if t ∈ y
0 if t ∈ x− y
(3)
Then any function h ∈ x2 belongs to the range of f since
h = f({t ∈ x : h(t) = 1}).
Suppose now that x is a qset such that qc(x) is the natural number n
and that all elements of x are indistinguishable one each other (the natural
numbers are defined in Q in the usual way, just in the model of ZFU we
have defined in Q).3 In this case, we cannot define the characteristic quasi-
function χqy for y ⊆ x, since, for instance, if χ
q
y(t) =E 1 for t ∈ y, then
χqy(w) =E 1 as well for every w ∈ x, independently if either w belongs to y
or not. This is due to the definition of the quasi-functions given above, since
for every quasi-function f ,
3For all we need, it is sufficient to consider finite qsets (this definition is also standard).
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〈a, b〉 ∈ f ∧ 〈c, d〉 ∈ f ∧ a ≡ c⇒ b ≡ d.
In other words, if the image of a certain t by the quasi-function f is 1,
then the image of every element indistinguishable from t will be 1 as well. So,
Q distinguishes only between two quasi-functions from x to 2, namely, that
one which associate 1 to all elements of x and that one which associate 0 to
all of them. This is the motive why we used qc(α2) to mean 2qc(x), since both
α and 2 may be viewed as sets (in the standard sense). If we had used x2
instead, we would be unable to distinguish among certain quasi-functions, so
complicating the meaning ofQ25, since we could have no manner of counting
the number of subquasi-sets of a qset. But, by using α2, since both α and 2
behave ‘classically’, we keep Q25 with its usual meaning.
From these considerations, we may conclude that when x is a qset whose
elements are indistinguishable m-atoms, we cannot prove within Q that if
qc(x) =E n, so we cannot assert that x has 2
n subquasi-sets. Since this is
precisely what Q25 intuitively says, we may affirm that this axiom cannot
be proved from the remaining axioms of Q. But, since it holds for particular
qsets, namely, to those which are sets , it cannot be disproved as well. In
order to state that Q25 cannot be disproved, consider the sets in Q; since
they behave as classical sets, we can prove that what Q25 asserts is true.
Now it suffice to take a qset whose elements are indistinguishable m-atoms
and such that qc(x) = α.
2.4 The ‘weak’ extensionality
The absence of a theory of identity for the m-atoms, due to the lack of
meaning of speaking about either the identity or the difference of m-atoms,
causes the necessity of a modification in the Axiom of Extensionality, which
here does not hold as in standard set theories. In order to do so, let us
introduce the following definition:
Definition 5 For all non empty quasi-sets x and y,
Sim(x, y) := ∀z∀t(z ∈ x ∧ t ∈ y ⇒ z ≡ t) In this case we say that x and
y are similars.
QSim(x, y) := Sim(x, y) ∧ qcard(x) =E qcard(y). That is, x and y are
Q-similar iff they are similar and have the same quasi-cardinality.
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(Q26)Weak Extensionality: Qsets which have the same quantity of elements
of the same sort are indistinguishable. In symbols,
∀Qx∀Qy((∀z(z ∈ x/≡ ⇒ ∃t(t ∈ y/≡ ∧ ∧QSim(z, t))))
∧∀t(t ∈ y/≡ ⇒ ∃z(z ∈ x/≡ ∧ ∧QSim(t, z)))⇒ x ≡ y)
AxiomQ26 allows us to remark another point aboutQ25. As in standard
set theories, if card(x) =E n, then are there exactly n subsets of x which are
singletons? If not, how can we make sense to the idea that if qc(x) =E n,
then x has n elements? We recall that the main motivation of Q is the way
quantum mechanics deals with elementary particles. In this theory, despite
there is a sense in saying that, say, there are k electrons in a certain level of
a certain atom, there is no way of counting them or of distinguishing among
them (see [25], Chap. 12).
If x is a qset whose elements are indistinguishable from one another as
above (let us suppose again that qc(x) =E n, which suffices for our purposes),
then the singletons y ⊆ x are indistinguishable one each other, as results
from the weak extensionality axiom Q26. So, all the singletons (in the
intuitive sense) seem to fall in just one qset. But it should be recalled that
these ‘singletons’ (subqsets whose quasi-cardinality is 1) are not identical
(that is, they are not the same object), but they are indistinguishable in a
precise sense (given by Q26). In other words, despite the theory cannot
distinguish among them, we cannot state neither that they are the same
qsets nor that their elements are identical. So, it is consistent with Q to
suppose that if qc(x) = α, then x has precisely α ‘singletons’. So, due to
Q25, the theory does not forbid the existence of such singletons, despite in
Q we cannot prove that they exist as ‘distinct’ entities, and hence we may
reason in Q as physicists do when informaly dealing with a certain number
of indistinguishable elementary particles.
By means of Q26 it is easy to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6
1. x =E ∅ ∧ y =E ∅ ⇒ x ≡ y
2. ∀Qx∀Qy(Sim(x, y) ∧ qc(x) =E qc(y)⇒ x ≡ y)
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3. ∀Qx∀Qy(∀z(z ∈ x⇔ z ∈ y)⇒ x ≡ y)
4. x ≡ y ∧ qc([x]) =E qc([y])⇔ [x] ≡ [y]
2.5 Replacement axioms
To keep Q with a structure similar to ZFU, we may state the Replacement
Axioms as it follows:
If A(x, y) is a formula in which x and y are free variables, we say that
A(x, y) defines a y − (qfunctional) condition on the quasi-set t if ∀w(w ∈
t ⇒ ∃sA(w, s) ∧ ∀w∀w′(w ∈ t ∧ w′ ∈ t ⇒ ∀s∀s′(A(w, s) ∧ A(w′, s′) ∧ w ≡
w′ ⇒ s ≡ s′)) (this is abbreviated by ∀x∃!yA(x, y)). Then, we have:
(Q27) Replacement
∀x∃!yA(x, y)⇒ ∀Qu∃Qv(∀z(z ∈ v ⇒ ∃w(w ∈ u ∧A(w, z)))
2.6 The concept of strong singleton
Definition 6 A strong singleton of x is a quasi-set x′ which satisfies the
following property:
x′ ⊆ [x] ∧ qc(x′) =E 1
In words, a strong singleton of x is a qset whose only element is an
indistinguishable from x. In standard set theories, this qset is of course the
singleton whose only element is x itself, but here x may be an m-atom, and
in this case there is no way of speaking of something being x. Even so, we
can prove that such a qset exists:
Theorem 7 For all x, there exists a strong singleton of x.
Proof: The qset [x] exists by the weak pair axiom. Since x ∈ [x] (recall
that ≡ is reflexive), we have qc([x]) ≥E 1 by Q20. But, by Q21, there
exists a subqset of [x] which has quasi-cardinal 1. Take this qset to be
x′. ✷
Theorem 8 All the strong singletons of x are indistinguishable.
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Proof: Immediate consequence of Q26, since all of them have the same
quasi-cardinality 1 and their elements are indistinguishable by defini-
tion. ✷
The important remark is that, as we shall see, we cannot prove that
the strong singletons of x are extensionaly identicals. In Q, the concept of
difference of qsets is introduced in the usual way: x − y is the qset whose
elements are the elements of x which do not belong to y. But, in what
respects indistinguishable m-atoms, we cannot give ostensive definitions, say
by puting the finger over an m-atom and saying ‘That is Peter’. Even so,
as in quantum physics, we may reason as if a certain element does belong
to the qset or not; the excluded middle law remains valid, even if we cannot
verify what case holds.4 This idea fits what happens with the electrons in an
atom; in general we know how many electrons there are, and we can say that
some of them are in that atom, but we cannot tell what are the particular
electrons which are in: this question simply loose its usual meaning.
Coming back to the meaning of x−y, we will show that the quasi-cardinal
of x− y is, as expected, qc(x)− qc(y).
Theorem 9 For all qsets x and y, if y ⊆ x, then qc(x−y) =E qc(x)−qc(y).
Proof: By definition, t ∈ x − y iff t ∈ x ∧ t /∈ y. Then (x − y) ∩ y =E ∅.
Hence, by Q24, qc((x − y) ∪ y) =E qc(x − y) + qc(y) (let us call this
expression (i)). But, since y ⊆ x, (x− y) ∪ y =E x and so, in order (i)
to be true, qc(x− y) =E qc(x)− qc(y).✷
The next result may be viewed as a quasi-set-theoretical version of the
indistinguishability Postulate used in quantum physics. Roughly speaking, it
says that permutations of indistinguishable quanta are not observable, and
constitute one of the most basic metaphysical assumptions which underly
quantum mechanics [14]. In order to state and prove this result, we introduce
a definiton.
4As in standard mathematics, let us remark, there is no effective procedure for proving
the valitity of the Law of the Excluded Middle, given inputs x and y, to decide either
x ∈ y or x /∈ y.
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Definition 7 1. Let x be a qset such that E(x), that is (according to
Definition 1), its elements are also qsets. Then,
⋂
t∈x
t := [z ∈
⋃
t∈x
t : ∀s(s ∈ x⇒ z ∈ s)]
2. If m(u),5 then Su := [s ∈ P([u]) : u ∈ s]
3. u∗ :=
⋂
t∈Su t
Lemma 1 If m(u), then:
1. u ∈
⋃
t∈Su t
2. ∀s(s ∈ Su ⇒ u ∈ s)
3. z ∈ u∗ iff z ∈
⋃
t∈Su t ∧ ∀s(s ∈ Su ⇒ z ∈ s)
4. u ∈ u∗
5. u∗ ⊆ [u]
6. If s ∈ Su, then u
∗ ⊆ s
Proof: (1) z ∈
⋃
t∈Su t iff ∃t(t ∈ Su ∧ z ∈ t). Therefore, by the above
definition, z ∈
⋃
t∈Su t iff ∃t(t ∈ P([u]) ∧ u ∈ t ∧ z ∈ t). But since
[u] ∈ P([u]) and u ∈ [u], it follows that u ∈
⋃
t∈Su t. (2) ∀s(s ∈ Su ⇔
s ∈ P([u]) ∧ u ∈ s). Therefore, ∀s(s ∈ Su ⇒ u ∈ s). (c) Immediate
consequence of the above definition. (4) Immediate consequence of (1)-
(3) above. (5) Suppose that z ∈ u∗. By (3), we have ∀s(s ∈ Su ⇒ z ∈
s). But since [u] ∈ Su, it results that z ∈ [u]. (6) If z ∈ u
∗, then, as
before, ∀s(s ∈ Su ⇒ z ∈ s). But, by hyphotesis, s ∈ Su; so, z ∈ s. ✷
Lemma 2 If u is an m-atom and z is a qset, then if z ⊆ u∗ and qc(z) =E 1,
it results that either u ∈ u∗ − z or qc(u∗) =E 1.
5This is of course the most interesting case. The generalization of this definition to
M -atoms and sets, so as the results that follow, is immediate, but in this case the results
coincide with the analogous (and sometimes trivial) situations in standard set theories.
The case of m-atoms is really that one which makes the difference.
18
Proof: Suppose u /∈ u∗−z. Since u ∈ u∗, it follows that u ∈ z. But z ⊆ u∗ ⊆
[u], therefore z ∈ Su. But, by item (6) of the above Lemma, u
∗ ⊆ z.
By hypothesis, z ⊆ u∗, hence u∗ =E z, and so qc(u
∗) =E qc(z) =E 1.
✷
Theorem 10 For every u, qc(u∗) =E 1.
Proof: By item (4) of Lemma (1), u∗ 6=E ∅. So, by Q20, qc(u
∗) 6=E 0,
hence qc(u∗) ≥E 1. We shall show that the equality holds. Suppose
that qc(u∗) >E 1. Then, by Q21, there exists a qset w ⊆ u
∗ such that
qc(w) =E 1. So, by Lemma (2), u ∈ u
∗ − w. But u∗ − w ⊆ [u], since
u∗ ⊆ [u]. Therefore, u∗−w ∈ Su. By Lemma (1), item (6), u
∗ ⊆ u∗−w.
But since u∗ − w ⊆ u∗, it follows that u∗ =E u
∗ − w. Again by Q20,
w 6=E ∅ since qc(w) =E 1. Then let be t ∈ w. So, t ∈ u
∗ since w ⊆ u∗,
hence t ∈ u∗−w (once u∗ =E u
∗−w). Then t /∈ w, a contradiction. ✷
Lemma 3 For all m-atoms u and v, if u ≡ v, then u∗ ≡ v∗. Furthermore,
if u ∈ w, then u∗ ⊆ w for any qset w.
Proof: By Lemma (1), item (5), u∗ ⊆ [u] and v∗ ⊆ [v]; if u ≡ v then
Sim(u∗, v∗) (see Definition (5)). But, by Theorem (10), qc(u∗) =E 1
and qc(v∗) =E 1 and then, by theorem (6), item (2), u
∗ ≡ v∗. The last
part can be proven by noting that if u ∈ w, then u ∈ w ∩ [u], so as
w ∩ [u] ⊆ [u], therefore w ∩ [u] ∈ Su. Then, by Lemma (1), item (6),
u∗ ⊆ w ∩ [u] and so u∗ ⊆ w. ✷
These last results show that u∗ is, as expected, one of the strong singletons
of u. The remarkable fact is that we cannot prove that u∗ ≡ v∗ entails u∗ =E
v∗. This is due to the fact that nothing in the theory can assure that that m-
atom that belongs to u∗ is the same m-atom that belongs to v∗, since neither
the expression u = v nor u =E v are well formed formulas. Furthermore, it
is interesting to recall that the usual Extensionality Axiom, which could be
used for expressing this fact, is not an axiom of our theory but, instead, we
have the “weak” axiom Q26 which talks about indistinguishability only, but
not about identity. The impossibility of proving the mentioned result should
be not regarded as a deficiency of the theory, but rather as expressing that
it is closer to what happens in quantum physics than usual set theories. We
shall be back to this point below.
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2.7 Permutations are not observable
The next theorem states in the theory Q the intuitive idea mentioned above
that permutations are not observable. To understand the meaning of this,
recall that in standard set theories if z ∈ x, then (x − {z}) ∪ {w} = x iff
z = w. So, let us prove the next theorem:
Theorem 11 Let x be a qset such that x 6=E [z] and z an m-atom such that
z ∈ x. If w ≡ z and w /∈ x, then there exists w′ such that
(x− z′) ∪ w′ ≡ x
Proof: Case 1: t ∈ z′ does not belong to x. In this case, x− z′ =E x and so
we may admit the existence of w′ such that its unique element s does
belong to x (for instance, s may be z itself); then (x− z′) ∪ w′ =E x.
Case 2: t ∈ z′ does belong to x. Then qc(x − z′) =E qc(x)− 1 by the
above Theorem. Then we take w′ such that its element is w itself, and
so it results that (x−z′)∩w′ =E ∅. Hence, by Q25, qc((x−z
′)∪w′) =E
qc(x). This intuitively says that both (x−z′)∪w′ and x have the same
quantity of indistinguishable elements So, by applyingQ27 (see above),
we obtain the theorem. ✷
When w /∈ x, we have the desired case according to which the theorem
is intuitively saying that we have ‘exchanged’ an element of x by an indis-
tinguishable one, and that the resulting fact is that ‘nothing has occurred at
all’. In other words, the resulting qset is indistinguishable from the original
one. The above theorem is the quasi-set theoretical version of the quan-
tum mechanical fact which expresses that permutations of indistinguishable
particles are not regarded as observable, as expressed by the so called In-
distinguishability Postulate. The relations between quasi-sets and quantum
objects are discussed from different points of view in [14, 7, 16].
2.8 The Axiom of Choice
Finally, the theory Q has a version of the axiom of choice.
(Q28) The Axiom of Choice
∀Qx(E(x) ∧ ∀y∀z(y ∈ x ∧ z ∈ x⇒ y ∩ z =E ∅ ∧ y 6=E ∅)⇒
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∃Qu∀y∀v(y ∈ x ∧ v ∈ y ⇒ ∃Qw(w ⊆ [v] ∧ qc(w) =E 1 ∧ w ∩ y ≡ w ∩ u)))
Of course this axiom is formulated only to keep Q strong enough to be
compared with standard ZF, as we did with the Replacement Axioms. As we
see, in the axiom, the “choice qset” is formed by taking one indistinguishable
from each member of the qset x. Since we can obtain qsets with quasi-
cardinal 2 whose elements are indistinguishable m-atoms, we may reason as
if these qsets act as Fraenkel’s “cells” [5] in order to obtain, as he did, a proof
of the independence of the axiom of choice from the remaining axioms of Q.
As it is well known, the Urelemente of ZFU set theory are indistinguishable
in a sense (they are invariant under automorphisms), but even so they do
obey the classical theory of identity (they are individuals in a sense). By
the contrary, m-atoms act as “legitimate” indistinguishable entities, so being
closer to intuition.
3 Some Issues of Identity
In this section we make a critical analysis on the foundations of equality
in first order theories from the point of view of quasi-sets. This is done by
means of the study of alternative formulations of quasi-set theory. According
to axiom Q4:
∀x∀y(x =E y ⇒ (A(x, x)⇒ A(x, y))).
The question we want raise is: what would happen if we rephrase this
sentence in a somehow stronger way? One possibility is:
∀x∀y(x ≡ y ⇒ (A(x, x)⇒ A(x, y))), with the usual restrictions.
But in this case, we can easily see that indistinguishability collapses to
identity. So, is there any other possible alternative version for Q4, which is
stronger than Q4, but such that it does not collapse to identity. We do not
think so. We will illustrate our ideas by means of an alternative version for
Q4, which we call Q4#:
Q4# - ∀x∀y(¬m(x) ∧ ¬m(y) ∧ x ≡ y ⇒ (A(x, x)⇒ A(x, y))).
21
We can see thatQ4# is stronger thanQ4 sinceQ4# allows substitutivity
for indistinguishable qsets which are not extensionaly identical. But the
question is: is Q4# weaker than identity?
In this section we will prove some lemmas and theorems within the scope
of a quasi set theory which replaces Q4 in Q by Q4#. We call this theory
Q#. Our main goal is to allow a better understanding of identity in first
order theories. We will prove here that Q# is equivalent to ZFU set theory,
since indistinguishability, in this case, collapses to identity.
Lemma 4 For all qsets x and y we have:
1. If t ∈ x and x ≡ y then t ∈ y;
2. If x ≡ y then x =E y.
Proof: (1) Since x is a qset, then ¬m(x), according to definition (1). Since
x ≡ y then ¬m(y) (Q9). Now, for all qsets u and v let At(u, v) := (t ∈
u∧ t ∈ v). By hypothesis, t ∈ x∧ t ∈ x, i.e., At(x, x). Since x ≡ y then,
according to Q4#, At(x, y). Hence t ∈ y. (2) If x ≡ y then, according
to item 1 of this proof, t ∈ x iff t ∈ y, which means that x =E y.✷
Lemma 5 For all m-atom x, [x] =E x
∗, where x∗ is given by definition (7).
Proof: Let t ∈ [x]. According to the definition of weak singleton, t ≡ x.
According to Q9, t is an m-atom. From lemma (3), we have t∗ ≡ x∗.
Note that the proof of lemma (3) does not make any reference to Q4,
so we can use it here, although we are working in Q#. From definition
(7) we know that t∗ and x∗ are qsets. So, t∗ =E x
∗, according to lemma
(4). So, since t ∈ t∗, then t ∈ x∗. Therefore [x] ⊆ x∗. From lemma (1)
(which also does not make any reference to Q4 in its proof) x∗ ⊆ [x].
So, [x] =E x
∗.✷.
Lemma 6 For all m-atoms x and y, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. x ≡ y;
2. x∗ ≡ y∗;
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3. x∗ =E y
∗;
4. [x] =E [y];
5. [x] ≡ [y].
Proof: By lemma (3) (1)⇒ (2); By Q4# (2)⇒(3); By lema (5) (3)⇒ (4);
by theorem (6), item (3), (4)⇒ (5); By the same theorem, item (4),
(5)⇒ (1).✷
Theorem 12 For all m-atom x, qc([x]) =E 1.
Proof: Straightforward from lemma (5) and theorem (10) (which makes no
reference to Q4 in its proof).✷
Lemma 7 For all m atoms x and y and for all qset w, if x ≡ y and x ∈ w,
then y ∈ w.
Proof: From lemma (3) x∗ ⊆ w. From lemma (6) y∗ ⊆ w. From lemma (1),
item (4), y ∈ w.✷
Lemma 8 For all m-atoms x and y and for all qset w:
1. If x ≡ y and [x] ∈ w, then [y] ∈ w;
2. If x ≡ y and [x] ⊆ w then [y] ⊆ w.
Proof: If x ≡ y then, from lemma (6), [x] ≡ [y]. But [x] and [y] are qsets.
Then, from Q4# we have (1) and (2).✷
Lemma 9 For all m-atoms x and y and for all λ and z:
1. If x ≡ y and qc([x]) =E λ then qc([y]) =E λ;
2. If x ≡ y and z ∈ [x] then z ∈ [y].
Proof: (1) Follows from theorem (12). (2) Follows from Q12 and Q2.✷
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Next follows the main result of this section:
Theorem 13 With the usual restrictions, ∀x∀y(x ≡ y ⇒ (A(x, x)⇒ A(x, y))).
Proof: Suppose m(x). From Q9, m(y). In this case, A(x, x) is only built
from the following types of atomic formulas for some qset w: (1) x ∈ w;
(2) [x] ∈ w; (3) [x] ⊆ w; (4) qc([x]) =E λ; (5) z ∈ [x]. From lemmas
(7), (8), and (9), we have: (1) y ∈ w; (2) [y] ∈ w; (3) [y] ⊆ w; (4)
qc([y]) =E λ; (5) z ∈ [y], i.e., if A(x, x) then A(x, y). Suppose now that
¬m(x). According to Q9 ¬m(y). By means of Q4#, if A(x, x) then
A(x, y).✷
This last theorem says that indistinguishability ≡ collapses into identity
in Q#. So, Q# is equivalent to standard ZFU.
This last theorem depends essentially on the Weak Axiom of Extension-
ality Q26. It is worth to remark that axiom Q4# was used by one of us in
[12]. But in that paper the Axiom of Extensionality was different also. So,
some results presented here are not valid in the quasi-set theory introduced
in [12].
4 Physics: The Maxwell-Boltzmann Statis-
tics
The contents of this section are also discussed in [22].
According to usual textbooks on statistical mechanics, Maxwell-Boltzmann
(MB) statistics gives us the most probable distribution of N distinguishable
objects into, say, boxes with a specified number of objects in each box. In
this section we show that the hypothesis concerning the objects being distin-
guishable is unnecessary.
4.1 Some Standard Results in ZF
It is a well known theorem in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory the following:
Lemma 10 If x is a finite ZF-set, then
card(P(x)) = 2card(x).
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Theorem 14 Let x be a non-empty and finite ZF-set. If we define x2 as
a set of ordered pairs 〈y1, y2〉 such that y1, y2 ∈ P(x), y1 ∪ y2 = x, and
y1 ∩ y2 = ∅ then card(x2) = 2
card(x).
This theorem corresponds to say that the number of ways we can dis-
tribute N distinguishable particles (N = card(x)) between two boxes (rep-
resented by the ordered pair 〈y1, y2〉) is 2
N .
Theorem 15 Let x be a finite ZF-set such that card(x) = N . If we define
xn as a set of ordered n-tuples 〈y1, · · · , yn〉 such that for all i = 1, · · · , n we
have yi ∈ P(x),
⋃
i yi = x, and i 6= j ⇒ yi ∩ yj = ∅, then card(xn) = n
N .
We could rewrite theorem (15) as:
Theorem 16 Let x be a finite ZF-set such that card(x) = N . If we define
xn as a set of ordered n-tuples 〈y1, · · · , yn〉 such that for all i = 1, · · · , n we
have yi ∈ P(x),
⋃
i yi = x, and
∑
i card(yi) = card(x), then card(xn) = n
N .
Proof: Analogous to the proof of theorem (15), since
⋃
i yi = x, and i 6= j ⇒
yi ∩ yj = ∅ iff
⋃
i yi = x, and
∑
i card(yi) = card(x).✷
This theorem corresponds to say that the number of ways that we can
distribute N distinguishable particles (N = card(x)) among n boxes (repre-
sented by the ordered n-tuple 〈y1, · · · , yn〉) is n
N .
4.2 Quasi-Set-Theoretical Combinatorics
We can obtain a perhaps more fruitful theory, which allows us a quasi-set
theoretical combinatorics, if we exchange the axiom Q25 by the following
postulate, which is a generalization ofQ25), as well as a quasi-set theoretical
version of theorem (15):
Q25’ Let x be a finite quasi-set such that qc(x) =E N . If we define zn as the
quasi-set whose elements are ordered n-tuples 〈y1, · · · , yn〉, where, for
all i =E 1, · · · , n, we have yi ∈ P(x),
⋃
i yi = x, and
∑
i qc(yi) =E qc(x),
then we have the following:
qc(zn) =E n
N . (4)
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In the case where n =E 2, we have a sentence which is equivalent to axiom
Q25.
The main role of axiom Q25’ is to allow us a quasi-set theoretical com-
binatorics which can be useful to cope with distribution functions. From the
mathematical point of view, it is important to show that the substitution
of axiom Q25 by axiom Q25’ does not entail any inconsistency in quasi-set
theory. This shall be proved in the Section 5. The point, at this moment, is
that Q25 is very ‘poor’ if we are interested on a quasi-set-theoretical com-
binatorics with more than two physical states or ‘boxes’, as exemplified in
the Introduction. Besides, axiom Q25’ is our quasi-set theoretical version of
theorem (16).
If we recall the polynomial of Leibniz, we can rewrite equation (4) as:
qc(zn) =E n
N =E
∑ N !
Πi=1,···nni!
, (5)
where the sum is over all possible combinations of nonnegative integers ni
such that
∑
i=1,···,n ni =E N .
If we interpret n as the number of physical states, N as the total number
of particles and ni as the number of particles associated to each physical state
i, then it is easy to see that each parcel of the summation in equation (5) is a
possible MB distribution of N particles among n states. The most probable
among all these parcels is the MB distribution. So, we can add equation (5),
with its respective interpretation, as another extra-assumption in quasi-set
theory. In other words, we are generalizing theory Q, by replacing axiom
Q25 by axiom Q25’. We refer to this generalized quasi-set theory as Q′. If
we do not replace axiomQ25 by Q25’, there is no manner of saying anything
about a distribution of N particles among an arbitrary number n of states
or boxes. In this case, we would be confined to the very particular case of 2
states.
It is easy to see that, for all i we have ni =E qc(yi). Axiom Q25’ is
just another way of saying that the number of ways we can distribute N
objects (either distinguishable or not) among n boxes is nN . The condi-
tion that
⋃
i yi =E x, and
∑
i qc(yi) =E qc(x) is simply a way to guarantee
that there will be no ‘repeated occurence’ of the same object in two boxes.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the expression ‘repeated occurence’, in this
quasi-set-theoretical context, is just an intuitive approach for didactical pur-
poses, since there is no sense in saying that the ‘same’ object cannot occupy
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two boxes.
The reader could ask: what are the so-called “boxes”? Each yi cor-
responds to a given box or physical state. There can be, of course, two
indistinguishable boxes yi and yj. In this case, the labels i and j cannot
individualize each box. They are just different names, or labels, attributed
to two indistinguishable objects (qsets, in this case).
4.3 One Simple Example
Now, let us exhibit an example in order to illustrate our ideas. Consider a
collection of three indistinguishable particles to be distributed between two
possible states or ‘boxes’. According to standard textbooks on statistical me-
chanics, there are only four possibilities of distribution. On the other hand,
according to our axiomatic framework – axiom Q25’ – there are eight pos-
sibilities. If we impose that the occupation number of each box is constant,
the number of possibilities corresponds to one parcel of the sum in equation
(5).
The question now is: what about the extra four possibilities predicted
by axiom Q25’? The eight possibilities predicted by Q25’ and equation (5)
come from
23 =
3!
3!0!
+
3!
2!1!
+
3!
1!2!
+
3!
0!3!
.
So, we have one possibility with 3 particles in the first state and no
particle in the second state, plus three indistinguishable possibilities with
2 particles in the first state and 1 particle in the second state, plus three
indistinguishable possibilities with 1 particle in the first state and 2 particles
in the second state, plus one single possibility with no particle in the first
state and 3 particles in the remaining one. The calculation of the most
probable case is made for a large number of particles, following the standard
calculations of statistical mechanics.
Following our example, axiom Q25’ says that we can distribute 3 objects
(either indistinguishable or not) among 2 boxes in 23 manners (either indis-
tinguishable or not). But this axiom does not say how can we make this
distribution. If we do not appeal to equation (5), we have the following: ac-
cording to Fig. 1, there are, at least, by means of axiom Q16, four possible
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distributions. But axiom Q25’ says that there are eight possible distribu-
tions. One possibility is something like Fig. 2, that is, the four distributions
in Fig. 1 plus four distributions which are indistinguishable from the third
distribution of Fig. 1. The reader can easily imagine other possibilities. So,
axiom Q25’ by itself does not allow us to derive MB statistics. It simply
says that MB statistics is a possibility even in a collection of indiscernibles.
Axiom Q25’ and equation (5), with its respective interpretation in the con-
text of Q25’, is a way to say that the only possibility is that one illustrated
at the Fig. 3.
5 Quantum Statistics
Since we may have MB distribution among non-individuals, what is the dif-
ference between quantum statistics and MB, after all? In Bose-Einstein we
take into account only distinguishable possibilities , among all possibilities
predicted by axiom Q25’. And Fermi-Dirac is derived in the same vein, but
with the additional assumption of the quasi-set theoretical version of Pauli’s
Exclusion Principle: qc(yi) ≤ 1 for each i in Q25’. Put it in another way,
quantum statistics may be seen as special cases of MB statistics in a collec-
tion of indistinguishable particles. Another way, more complicated, to get
quantum statistics in quasi-set theory is introduced in [16].
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Figure 1: The ‘first’ four possible distributions of 3 objects (indistinguishable
or not) among 2 boxes. Each line represents one possible distribution and
each bullet represents an object.
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Figure 2: One possible sequence of the eight possible distributions of 3 objects
among 2 boxes according to axiom Q25’.
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Figure 3: The only possible distribution of 3 objects among 2 boxes, if we
conjugate axiom Q25’ and equation (2).
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